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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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COMMENT ON FIRST TWO MEETINGS IN RESUMED KOREAN TALKS

The 26 and 27 April meetings of the resumed Korean truce talks have confirmed earlier indications ☐

☐ that the Communists would (1) reject Switzerland as a neutral, (2) demand a much longer period for making "explanations" to the prisoners than the 60 days suggested by the UN Command, and (3) seek to prevent the neutral state from deciding the disposition of prisoners who remain unwilling to return.

There is no reason to alter the belief ☐ ☐ that the Communists will adhere to the principle of total repatriation and that they envisage prolonged negotiations in which to make their final compromise as small as possible.

There is no reliable information on the Communist choice for the neutral state. While Czechoslovakia may be put forward, the Communists might well accept India.

The Communists are probably prepared to compromise on their demands for a six-month period to make "explanations" -- perhaps at four months. The current Communist proposal strongly supports earlier indications of a Communist belief that the great majority of prisoners now unwilling to return could eventually be induced to change their minds.

The Communists may agree to some other device than a political conference for deciding the ultimate fate of the unwilling. There is still no evidence, however, that in the absence of military pressure the Communists will agree to any arrangement which would ultimately free a substantial number of prisoners.

The Communists almost certainly judge that the UN Command will not abruptly recess the talks. Communist propaganda continues to suggest Communist confidence that, if the UN does suspend the talks, the onus for failure to reach an agreement can be placed on the United States.

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